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INTRODUCTION 
Recognition of the significance of the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act of 19701 for the law of torts and of particular elements of the law of 
torts for the administration of the Act is emerging slowly in reference to two 
areas of inquiry. First, to what extent are persons charged with invocation 
and application of the Act's enforcement provisions required or permitted 
to read concepts of tort law into the duties imposed and the defenses allowed 
under the Act?2 Second, are any new rights, remedies, or other substantive or 
procedural advantages added to the arsenals of plaintiffs' attorneys seeking 
redress for clients injured as a result of alleged violations of the Act?3 Before 
discussing those two questions,4 this article briefly explores the broader im-
plications of the Act for the future of accident law in general. 
I 
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ACT FOR THE FUTURE 
OF ACCIDENT LAW 
Reduced to its essentials, the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 
is a rather primitive system of social control designed to reduce or eliminate 
hazards to employees' safety and health in the workplace.5 Rules are pre-
scribed by government agencies and enforced by government officials using 
familiar coercive sanctions-monetary penalties, fines and, if necessary, jail 
*Professor of Law, University of Hawaii. The author was a member of the OSHA-Ohio State 
University Project which drafted a proposed state plan and statute for the State of Ohio. 
129 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1970). 
2 See, e.g., REA Express, Inc. v. Brennan, 495 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1974); National Realty & 
Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Morey, The General Duty Clause of Ihe 
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 86 HARV. L. REv. 988 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Morey]. 
3 See, e.g., Skidmore v. Travelers Ins. Co., 356 F. Supp. 670 (E.D. La.), affd per curiam, 483 
F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973); Stramondo, Litigation Impact, 9 TRIAL, Jul.-Aug. 1973, at 29; Comment, 
Federal Common Law Remedies Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 47 WASH. L. 
REv. 629 (1972). 
4 With respect to the first question, I will treat mainly the federal Act rather than state plans. 
However, to the extent that the federal Act imposes obligations different from, and more strin-
gent than, the common law would require the same reasoning ought to apply to state plans. 
See Occ. Safety & Health Act §§ 18(c) & (e), 29 U.S.C. §§ 667(c) & (e) (1970). 
As to the second area, I will limit my discussion principally to the extent to which OSHA 
safety duties may be expected to create new standards for tort liability or new causes of action. 
Time and space limitations do not permit discussion in this article of other duties imposed by the 
Act. See, e.g., id. §§ 8(d), ll(c) & 15, 29 U.S.C. §§ 657(d), 660(c) & 664. 
5 This is intended to be descriptive. It is not intended to be critical of the Act, its important 
purposes, or its ability to achieve those purposes. 
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terms.6 The principal significance of the utilization by Congress of such a 
primitive system of deterrence is that it constitutes another compelling piece 
of evidence of widespread recognition by public policy-makers that systems 
which were designed to provide compensation or individual justice for ac-
cident victims have not provided adequate deterrence against accidents. Such 
recognition tends to produce legislation,7 like the Act, which relies upon di-
rect regulation to change behavior as well as other legislation, such as no-fault 
schemes,8 designed to achieve restoration of accident losses.9 This tendency, 
in turn, substantially dilutes the importance of the accident reparations sys-
tem as a special deterrent to accidents. It follows that the fault system, already 
under heavy attack for its high costs, delays, and unfairness,lo will continue to 
lose the support it once had from those who believed its existence necessary 
to achieve such deterrenceP This withering of the fault system's raison d'etre, 
coupled with a parallel trend to provide universal subsidized medical and health 
care, and likely to be followed by demands for and eventual enactment of 
universal protection of income loss caused by illness or accident-related dis-
ability,12 may ultimately sound the death knell for the fault system of accident 
compensation as we now know it. Its future functions may be limited to providing 
optimum restoration in isolated cases where justice demands more than min-
6 Occ. Safety & Health Act § 17, 29 U.S.C. § 666 (1970). 
7 See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-81 (Supp. II, 1972); Traffic and 
Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-431 (1970). 
8 Cj. O'Connell, Expanding No-FauU Beyond Auto Insurance: Some Proposals, 59 VA. L. REv. 
749 (1973). 
9 Rather than refer to public policy goals and strategies in terms of economic theory, see 
G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970), I prefer for the purpose of this article to use 
the following terminology: (The reader should note that some of these terms are similar to but 
not the same as those used by Professor Calabresi.) 
Prevention: the avoidance of situations or conditions which lead to accidents before such 
situations or conditions occur. 
Mitigation: the creation of conditions which will tend to lessen the effect of accidents when 
they do occur. 
Interdiction: the interposition of some instrumentality, human or othenvise, which brings to 
an end an unsafe condition already in existence. 
Special deterrence: the encouragement of conduct conducive to safety by creating fear of 
the consequences which will follow from danger-creating acts or omissions. 
General deterrence: the imposition of burdens and disadvantages on a dangerous activity, 
thus making that activity less desirable than other, safer substitutes. 
Correction: the development of perspectives and operations for safety in people and institutions 
which would othenvise be non-safety oriented. 
Restoration: the restoration of the values which are lost as a consequence of accidents which 
are not prevented, interdicted, or deterred. 
Miller, The Needs and Potential for Cooperation Between Human Factors SPecialists and Lawyers in 
Research and Development of Automobile Accident Law, 14 HUMAN FACTORS 25 (1972). The terms 
are, in part, adaptations from Calabresi's work and, in part, suggested by objectives of the sanctioning 
process enumerated in a rather different context. See M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAw AND 
MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION 287-96 
(1961). 
10 See, e.g., R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM: A 
BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE (1965). 
11 Proponents of the fault system have often emphasized its value as a deterrent to accidents. 
See, e.g., THE DEFENSE REsEARCH INST., INC., FAULT: A DETERRENT TO HIGHWAY ACCIDENTS (1969). 
12 Cj. Bernstein, The Need for Reconsidering the Role of Workmen's Compensation, 119 U. PA. L. 
Rev. 992, 1001 (1971). But if. O'Connell, Elective No-Fault Liability Insurance for All Kinds of Accidents: 
A Proposal, 1973 INS. L. ].495, 503. 
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imum restoration13 or in areas where direct regulation cannot provide adequate 
deterrence.14 
What is curious about the trend toward direct regulation cum coercion, 
is that it comes during a period when the more sophisticated observers of the 
accident problem, recognizing that there are limits to the economic resources 
which can or ought to be devoted to the problem, have made powerful argu-
ments in favor of an approach which would seek the most effective mix of 
strategies. IS Nevertheless, Congress in developing the Act paid scant attention 
either to the potential deterrent effect of workmen's compensation and common 
law or statutory remedies or to the way in which such remedies might be inte-
grated with the Act in order to maximize its stated objectives at minimum cost.16 
This narrow focus which led to the development of a massive regulatory scheme 
to operate parallel to workmen's compensation, may be fully justified by 
the failures of workmen's compensation to achieve adequate deterrence in 
the past.11 However, there is less justification for Congress' failure-in the legis-
lation requiring a study of workmen's compensation which accompanied the 
Actl8-to call for examination of the potential safety and health effects of an 
expanded and improved workmen's compensation system and of whether such 
a system might in conjunction with a somewhat curtailed regulatory system 
achieve the goals of both systems more efficiently and cheaply. 
The failure to consider such an approach also bears upon the remaining 
questions to be discussed in this article. Congress' treatment of the Act's ef-
fect on existing compensation systems can only be characterized as an amateur-
ish attempt not to upset the status quO.19 Careful analysis of the relevant pro-
vision in the Act and the legislative history does not lead to confident predic-
tion about the specific effect of the Act on tort remedies. Similarly, Congress' 
preoccupation with prevention, interdiction, and special deterrence,2o and 
its confused and ambiguous discussion of the extent to which the employer's 
"general duty" incorporates common law concepts,21 suggests that those who 
interpret the Act should hesitate to import common law negligence standards 
13 As, for example, where defendant intentionally injures plaintiff. One possible difference 
between minimum restoration and optimum restoration is that the former might compensate 
only for economic losses while the latter might also compensate for intangible losses, such as pain 
and suffering. 
14 Cf O'Connell, supra note 8. 
15 G. CALABRESI, supra note 9; Boodman, Safety and Systems Analysis, With Application to Traffic 
Safety, 33 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 488 (1968). 
16 In legislation appended to the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Congress 
did call for a study of workmen's compensation laws. Occ. Safety & Health Act § 27, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 676 (1970). However, the avowed purpose was "to determine [whether] such laws provide 
an adequate, prompt, and equitable system of compensation." /d. Fonunately, however, the 
commission charged with implementing the study addressed itself to the relationship between 
workmen's compensation and "the safety objective." NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORK-
MEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS, THE REpORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S 
COMPENSATION LAWS 87-98 (1972). 
17 Cj. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAws, COMPENDIUM ON 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 287-93 (1973). 
18 Occ. Safety & Health Act § 27, 29 U.S.C. § 676 (1970). 
19 See text at pp. 628-30 infra. 
20 See note 9 supra. 
21 See text at pp. 621-22 infra. 
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or other potentially relevant common law principles into it. Instead, the Act 
should be interpreted primarily by reference to Congress' stated policies and 
objectives in relation to the nature and dimensions of the serious problems 
Congress intended to solve.22 As will be seen, only in this manner will the Act 
fulfill its promise by becoming "a safety bill of rights for close to 60 million 
workers."23 
II 
THE RELEVANCE OF TORT CONCEPTS TO THE GENERAL DUTY 
CLAUSE OF THE ACT 
The key operative provisions of the Act impose upon each employer two 
duties. The first, in the so-called "general duty" clause, requires that each 
employer "shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place 
of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or 
are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees."24 The 
second requires that each employer "shall comply with occupational safety 
and health standards promulgated [by the Secretary of Labor] under this 
chapter."25 A third provision applies to employees: "Each employee shall 
comply with occupational safety and health standards and all rules, regula-
tions, and orders issued pursuant to this chapter which are applicable to his 
own actions and conduct."26 The Act, however, contains no provision for en-
forcing employees' duties and no sanctions for their breach. 
The question arises whether, and to what extent, elements of tort-based 
duties, defenses, or other concepts mayor should be referred to in applying 
these duties. Discussion will focus on the general duty clause since the duty 
to comply with promulgated standards, on its face and also by virtue of clear 
inferences to be drawn from other provisions of the Act,27 is absolute and 
unqualified28 and because the legislative intent to make the employer's duty 
22 See REA Express, Inc. v. Brennan, 495 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1974). 
The generally accepted dimension of the occupational safety and health problem-about 
14,000 workers killed each year, over 2 million disabled, and uncounted numbers affected by 
occupational disease-and its costs are discussed in Statement of George P. Schultz, Secretary 
of Labor, in Hearings on S. 2193 and S. 2788 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on 
Labor and Public Welfare, 9Ist Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 76, 77 (1970). The actual dimensions 
of the total occupational injury and disease problem may turn out to be much greater when the 
more accurate statistics required by the Act are tabulated. See Statement of Jacob Clayman, Ad-
ministrative Director, Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO, in Hearings on the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act of 1970 (Oversight and Proposed Amendments) Before the Select Subcomm. on Labor 
of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 178, 186 (1973) [hereinafter cited 
as 1973 Oversight Hearings]. 
23 SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 92D CONG., 
1ST SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 197Q, 
at iii (Comm. Print 1971) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. 
24 Occ. Safety & Health Act § 5(a)(I), 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(l) (1970). 
25!d. § 5(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(2). 
28 [d. § 5(b), 29 U.S.C. § 654(b). 
27 Variances from standards, for example, are only permitted on the narrowest of grounds. 
[d. §§ 6(b)(6) & (d), 29 U.S.C. §§ 655(b)(6) & (d). 
28 But if. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. v. Brennan, 497 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1974) ("reasonable man" 
test read into safety regulation requiring protective equipment where "necessary by reason of 
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"primary" seems rather clearly to foreclose an employer's use of an employee'S 
violation of duty as a defense to citation for the employer's breach of his 
own duties.29 
A. Comparison With Common Law Duties 
On its face the general duty clause would seem to impose a duty on em-
ployers in some respects more stringent and in other respects less strin-
gent than the common law duty to refrain from negligence. At common 
law the employer was obliged only to exercise ordinary care to make his 
workplace safe for his employees. He had, on the one hand, an affirma-
tive obligation to eliminate unreasonable risks that were obvious and to 
make reasonable inspections in order to uncover and remove unreasonable 
hazards that were not.3D On the other hand, as is true generally with respect 
to the negligence standard, a calculus was devised wherein the degree of care 
to be exercised was measured by balancing the magnitude of the risk and the 
likelihood that it would cause injury against the burden of avoiding the risk.31 
Thus, permitting a minor risk of relatively minor injury to exist might, in 
theory, be deemed negligent (if such injury actually ensued) if the burden of 
removing the risk was, on balance, less costly than the risk. (Subject, of course, 
to the possibility that a court or jury might find the risk so improbable that 
a reasonable person would not worry about it in any event.) In applying the 
calculus, it is likely that both economic and technical feasibility could and did 
play major roles in measuring the burden for the purpose of determining 
whether a particular employer was negligent in failing to discover or elim-
inate a particular risk.32 Under the negligence standard a jury might be reluc-
tant to find, and an appellate court reluctant to uphold the finding, that an 
employer was negligent for failing to eliminate a risk-even a very serious 
risk-if to do so would have brought financial calamity to the employer's busi-
ness or industry. This application of the negligence standard, absolving an 
employer from liability for injuries caused by hazards which were not econom-
ically feasible to eliminate, has been generally agreed to be the product of 
the public policy favoring the growth of industry during the industrial rev-
olution and a resultant unwillingness to burden industry with the stricter 
duties applied in less dynamic eras.33 The more recent trend, of course, has 
hazards"); Secretary of Labor v. Standard Glass Co., 1 OCC. SAFETY & HEALTH REp. 1045 (OSHRC 
July 27, 1972). 
29 Accord, REA Express, Inc. v. Brennan, 495 F.2d 822, 825 (2d Cir. 1974); National Realty 
& Constr. Co. Y. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1266 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
30 See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS 525-30 (4th ed. 1971) [here-
inafter cited as PROSSER]; REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 492-520 (1958); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 332, commentj at 181 (1965). Of course, the employee's right to recover 
for breach of these duties was substantially limited by "the unholy trinity of common law defenses-
contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow servant rule." PROSSER 526-27. 
31 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947); Conway v. O'Brien, 
111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940). See also PROSSER 145-49. 
32 See PROSSER 145-49. Thus, for example, one of the reasons that evidence of industry cus-
tom is admissible is to establish that a particular precaution is feasible. Id. at 167-68. 
33 See generally James, Analysis of the Origin and Development of the Negligence Actions, in DEP'T 
OF TRANSPORTATION, THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEGLIGENCE ACTION 35-49 (1970). 
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been back toward stricter duties which impose the costs of accidents and other 
failures on industry, particularly manufacturers, without regard to the 
reasonableness of the defendant's actions.34 
The general duty clause of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 
1970, on fair reading, seems to impose an absolute duty on the employer, 
albeit a duty to eliminate only some risks-those that constitute "recognized 
hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm 
to his employees."35 The employer is under no obligation, in the absence of 
a specific standard, to eliminate nonrecognized hazards irrespective of the 
degree of risk they create, the degree of likelihood that they will cause or are 
causing death or serious physical harm, or the extent to which their nonelim-
ination might be deemed unreasonable from the standpoint of negligence law. 
Further, the employer is under no duty to eliminate even recognized hazards 
if they are likely to cause only serious mental or emotional, rather than 
physical, harm, if they are less than "likely" to cause death or serious physical 
harm, or if they are only likely to cause nonserious physical harm, even though 
these situations may give rise to liability under the law of negligence. 
On the other hand, the use of the word "free," under any fair interpre-
tation, does not seem to permit any negligence-type balancing of the degree 
and likelihood of risk against the cost or burden of removing it. Put another 
way, the balance seems to have been struck in advance by Congress when it 
decided which kinds of hazards must be eliminated.36 It would seem to follow, 
therefore, at least from the application of the "plain meaning" test, that an 
employer has an absolute obligation either to eliminate "recognized hazards 
that are causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his em-
ployees" even if this means closing his business or incurring a severe financial 
strain, or to pay the statutory penalty for failure to abate the violation. 
B. Contextual and Policy Analysis 
However, the "plain meaning" test is only the starting point for a contextual 
analysis designed to shed further light on the interpretation of the statutory 
language.37 It still remains to determine whether a meaning less absolute than 
the facial interpretation can be found by reference to the legislative intent 
either expressed or implied from Congress' objectives in relation to the nature 
and dimensions of the problem that Congress intended to solve. 
It had been suggested by one commentator that "the general duty clause 
should not be read to impose liability on an employer for the existence of 
statutory hazards which he cannot reasonably eliminate" and that "employers 
should be allowed the defense to the general duty requirement that elimination 
of a particular hazard is physically or economically impossible unless the entire 
34 See generally Noel, Comparison of Strict Liability in Products Area and Auto Accident Reparations, 
in id. at 67-90. 
35 Occ. Safety & Health Act § 5(a)(I), 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(I) (1970). 
36 CJ. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 393-94. 
37 CJ. M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & J. MILLER, THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND 
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 96-97 (1967). 
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employment activity is brought to a halt."38 However, the Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia, in the first definitive judicial interpretation of 
the general duty clause, refused to impose a reasonableness requirement in 
National Realty & Construction Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Com-
mission (OSHRC).39 Instead, the court imposed a requirement that the hazard 
be preventable by feasible means: 
On the one hand, the adjective rfree] is unqualified and absolute: A workplace 
cannot be just "reasonably free" of a hazard, or merely as free as the average 
workplace in the industry. On the other hand, Congress quite clearly did not 
intend the general duty clause to impose strict liability: The duty was to be an 
achievable one. Congress' language is consonant with its intent only where the 
"recognized" hazard in question can be totally eliminated from a workplace .... 
Congress intended to require elimination only of preventable hazards.40 
Avoiding the anomaly that a workplace cannot be free from hazards when 
a hazard, though not preventable, is present, Judge J. Skelly Wright simply 
held that a non-preventable hazard is not "recognized."41 The criterion to de-
termine whether a hazard is preventable, he wrote, is to draw its "content 
from the informed judgment of safety experts."42 And further: 
Hazardous conduct is not preventable if it is so idiosyncratic and implausible 
in motive or means that conscientious experts, familiar with the industry, would 
not take it into account in prescribin~ a safety program. Nor is misconduct I?re-
ventable if its elimination would require methods of hiring, training, monitormg, 
or sanctioning workers which are either so untested or so expensive that safety 
experts would substantially concur in thinking the methods unfeasible.43 
Both the "reasonableness" requirement and the requirement that hazards 
must be preventable to be recognized would require compliance officers to 
overlook some workplace hazards "causing or likely to cause death or serious 
physical harm." Judge Wright, however, recognized that enforcement of the 
general duty clause might in some cases "threaten the economic viability of the 
employer," but he recommended that, in such cases, "the Secretary should pro-
pose the precaution by way of promulgated regulations, subject to advance indus-
try comment, rather than through adventurous enforcement of the general duty 
clause."44 Thus, although the view taken by Judge Wright tends to be more 
protective of employees than does the imposition of a quasi-negligence test, it 
does introduce economic factors into the determination whether serious hazards 
are to be permitted to continue to exist in the workplace. 
I suggest that there is no warrant in the Act, in its legislative history, or 
in its policy to support the importation of economic factors into the general 
38 Morey 993. Early decisions of the OSHRC have applied a "reasonableness" standard. White 
& Carney, OSHA Comes of Age: The Law of Work Place Environment, 28 Bus. LAw. 1309, 1312-13 
(1973). 
39 489 F.2d 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
40 Id. at 1265-66. Accord, Brennan v. OSHRC, - F.2d - (7th Cir. 1974). 
41 489 F.2d at 1266. 
42Id. 
43 Id. 
44!d. at n.37. The implication is that the Secretary has the power to enforce the precaution, 
but should not exercise it. It is arguable, however, that the failure of a compliance officer to bring 
such a hazard to the employer's attention, if not to recommend a citation, might constitute action-
able negligence if the hazard subsequently caused injury to an employee. See text at pp. 637-
39 infra. 
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duty equation. Congress declared that the purpose of the Act was "to assure 
so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and health-
ful working conditions."45 While the "so far as possible" language can fairly 
be read to admit of some qualifications in the assurance, there are but two 
indications in the Act itself which suggest that "possible" is to be interpreted 
under any circumstances to mean "by feasible means" or to be otherwise qualified 
by incorporating considerations of economic burden. The first is the statement 
of purpose calling for the provision of "medical criteria which will assure in-
sofar as practicable that no employee will suffer diminished health, functional 
capacity, or life expectancy as a result of his work experience."46 It is clear, 
however, from the legislative history, that the qualifying words were added 
only to recognize the inescapable reality that work, no matter how free from 
specific safety and health hazards, may, because of inherent emotional pressures 
and physical demands, nevertheless shorten life or diminish health,47 and in 
addition, that it would be virtually impossible to eliminate the myriad of minor 
hazards which do not threaten serious harm. Most importandy, however, the 
limitation, insofar as it is one, is addressed to medical criteria-what constitutes 
"serious physical harm,"48 not to the definition of a "recognized hazard." 
Secondly, section 6(b)(5) provides, in part: 
The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials or 
harmful physical agents under this subsection, shall set the standard which most 
adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, 
that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional ca-
pacity even if such employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by 
such standard for the period of his working life .... In addition to the attain-
ment of the highest degree of health and safety protection for the employee, 
other considerations shall be the latest available scientific data in the field, the 
feasibility of the standards. and experience gained under this and other health 
and safety laws.49 
Here, it is arguable, both from the language itself and the legislative history, 
that the explicit references to feasibility and to the best available evidence 
and latest available scientific data may permit standards to be set which fall 
short of providing all possible safety and health,50 though it is by no means 
clear that the reference is to economic feasibility rather than technical feasi-
bility.51 On their face, however, such limitations are applicable only to standards 
for "toxic materials and harmful physical agents" and not to the general duty 
.~ Occ. Safety & Health Act § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1970). 
46 [d. § 2(7),29 U.S.C. § 651(7). 
47 See Remarks of Senator Dominick, in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 423, 480. 
48 See OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FIELD 
OPERATIONS MANUAL VIII B.LC. (2) (1974) [hereinafter cited as FOM]. 
49 Occ. Safety & Health Act § 6(b)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1970) (emphasis added). 
50 See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1188. 
51 Questions of feasibility may arise with respect to a number of different standard setting 
problems, such as: (1) ability to determine whether a substance or physical agent constitutes a 
hazard, (2) ability to determine which levels of the substance or agent are safe and which are not, 
(3) ability to detect whether hazardous levels of the substance or agent are present or being used 
in the workplace, (4) ability to devise means to keep the workplace free of toxic substances or 
harmful physical agents, (5) ability to produce and deliver equipment which would enable an 
employer to detect and/or eliminate the hazard from the workplace, and (6) economic ability of 
particular employers or an entire industry to comply with proposed standards. 
620 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBMEMS 
clause or to standards for other hazards. 52 Reference to the legislative his-
tory also suggests that the special limitations on the requirements for these 
standards arose out of recognition that the identification of which of the myriad 
of substances, chemicals, and physical agents already used in industry and 
being added each year are toxic and harmful to health presents intractable 
problems,53 as does the ability of the National Institute of Occupational 
Safety and Health (NIOSH) to formulate standards calling for threshold 
limit values or other adequate protections. 54 
It must be conceded, however, that the toxic substances provision consti-
tutes a crack in the dike of absolute protection which the Act othenvise seems 
to require. If Congress wanted protection "insofar as possible" it could have 
required industry to establish the safety of new substances and physical agents 
before introducing them into the workplace and to remove those whose safety 
has not been established. 55 It should be clear, however, that this crack permits 
only a leak and not a flood: not only is the provision limited in its terms to 
a particular class of cases, but it has no applicability once a standard has been 
set or a recognized hazard noted. Thus, for example, the Conference Report, 
. in the same paragraph in which this provision is discussed, states that "[elco-
nomic hardship is not to be a consideration for the qualification for a temporary 
extension order."56 Evidence could not be stronger that Congress foresaw and 
approved the requirement that safety and health be provided regardless of 
the economic hardship on a particular employer. 57 
It appears that, Judge Wright's interpretation of "recognized" aside, the 
absence of any other language in the Act qualifying or limiting the requirement 
that employment be free from certain recognized hazards is not merely a neutral 
Senator Dominick introduced the amendment containing the feasibility requirement with re-
spect to toxic substances and harmful physical agents. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 502. It seems 
clear that Senator Dominick was concerned with (4), the ability to keep certain employments 
free of safety and health hazards, when the employment was "inherently dangerous," id., or 
when the employee could not avoid being exposed to hazards such as those inevitably present 
for a bus driver or trolley car operator in traffic situations, id. at 423, 480. 
In addition, the enormous concern for occupational diseases caused by toxic subst.. .. .::es and 
harmful physical agents expressed in the hearings, see, e.g., Statement of Anthony Mazzocchi, 
Director, Citizenship-Legislative Department, Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, AFL-
CIO, in Hearings on S. 2193 and S. 2788 BefoTe the Subcomm. on LabOT of the Senate Comm. on Labor 
and Public Welfare, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 1007 (1970), and echoed in LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY 844-46, seem to lead to the conclusion that Congress' expressed policy to provide safe 
and healthful employment so far as possible would be disserved by providing economic hardship 
exceptions in cases where it is technically feasible both to detect hazardous levels of toxic substances 
and harmful physical agents in the environment and technically feasible to eliminate them. 
Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has determined, both as a 
matter of policy and by virtue of the limited scope of judicial review, that the Secretary may take 
economic factors into account under section 6(b)(5) of the Act. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO 
v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1974). This decision deserves reconsideration. 
52 Occ. Safety & Health Act §§ 6(b)(5) & (7), 29 U.S.C. §§ 655(b)(5) & (7) (1970). 
53 Cf. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 337-39, 1043-45. 
54 Cf. id. at 859. 
55 [d. 
56 See id. at 1188. 
57 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO 
v. Hodgson, 499 F. 2d at 478 (dictum), and National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F. 2d 
at 1266 n.37 (dictum), recognized that economic hardship might not provide a defense to a· 
particular employer. 
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factor, which might permit free-wheeling judicial or administrative inter-
pretation and qualification, but a positive indication that Congress confronted 
and resolved in the negative the issue of whether economic considerations 
were to be taken into account in applying and enforcing the general duty 
clause. Consider, for example, the ease with which Congress could have 
qualified the clause by using appropriate language drawn from negligence 
law and its ability to do so as demonstrated by the definition of a "serious vio-
lation"58 and by the use of "reasonableness" language in other provisions of 
the Act59 and in other regulatory laws which have been interpreted to permit 
consideration of economic factors. 6o Congress could have said "reasonably 
free from ... hazards" or "free from recognized hazards that are causing 
or likely to cause an unreasonable risk of death or serious physical harm to 
employees." It did neither. Furthermore, in the debates individual senators 
and congressmen recognized the absolute nature of the Act's duties.61 But 
most telling, perhaps, is the reference in both the Senate and House reports 
to an employer's general obligation under the Act "to bring no adverse ef-
fects to the life and health of [his] employees throughout the course of their 
employment."62 
The puzzling inconsistency between the assertions in the committee re-
ports of both houses63 that the general duty clause imposes common law 
duties, not an absolute duty, and that it calls for "no adverse effects" way be 
explained most plausibly by attributing to the committees an ignorance of 
the requirements of the common law.64 Alternatively, the committees may 
580CC. Safety & Health Act § 170), 29 U.S.C. § 6660) (1970). A serious violation of the Act 
exists "if there is a substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could result" and 
the employer knew or by exercising reasonable diligence could have known of the violation. 
The difference between a serious and nonserious violation is that penalties "shall" be assessed 
for the former, Uf. § 17(b), 29 U.S.C. § 666(b), but "may" be assessed for the latter, Uf. § 17(c), 
29 U.S.C. § 666(c). The Field Operations Manual states: "Citations based on the general duty clause 
should be limited to alleged serious violations." FOM VIII A.2.d. The reason given is that sections 
17(k) and 5(a)(1) of the Act, describing serious and general duty clause violations, use "virtually 
identical language." [d. A comparison of the two sections will reveal that the description of a general 
duty violation and a serious violation differ substantially. Indeed, there is no basis in the Act or 
in its policy for holding that a citation may not be issued for a violation of section 5(a)(1) unless 
it is serious as defined under section 17(k). 
59 See, e.g., Occ. Safety & Health Act §§ 3(8), 8(a)(2), lO(a), 10(c), & 16, 29 U.S.C. §§ 652(8), 
657(a)(2), 659(a), 659(c), & 665 (1970). Cf H.K. Porter Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 1 Occ. SAFETY 
& HEALTH REp. 1600, 1605 (OSHRC Mar. 22, 1974). 
60 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1392(a) & (f) (1970). See also Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 628 (1970); Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2056(a) (Supp. I, 
1972). Former state occupational safety and health laws also limited employers' duties to the 
exercise of reasonable care. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4101.01(k), 4101.11, 4101.12 
(Page 1973). 
There was a provision in the administration bill which would have permitted the standard 
setting board to "provide such reasonable limitations and ... make ... rules and regulations 
allowing reasonable variations, tolerances, and exemptions to and trom any or all of the provisions 
under this Act as it may find advisable and proper in the public interest." LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
57, 705. However, in final passage this section was limited to "reasonable variations, tolerances, 
and exemptions ... necessary and proper to avoid serious impairment of the national defense." 
Occ. Safety & Health Act § 16, 29 U.S.C. § 665 (1970) (emphasis added). 
61 See, e.g., Statement of Senator Saxbe, in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 345. 
62 [d. at 149, 851 (emphasis added). 
63 [d. 
64 For example, both reports contain the overbroad statement that "[u]nder principles of 
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have been referring either to the negligence standard as it has developed into 
virtually absolute liability under the F.E.L.A.,65 or to more recent judge-
made doctrines of liability developed in the products liability area, or, quite 
erroneously, to workmen's compensation. If the reference is to F.E.L.A. 
standards, it is at least arguable that a negligence-type calculus, albeit a very 
stringent one,66 might be applied in determining whether a violation of the 
general duty clause has been made out. Under this calculus the economic 
burden on the employer might become relevant. Congress' view that the duty 
is not an absolute one, however, may also be explained by the fact that the duty is 
hedged with expressed limitations.67 The better approach, I suggest, is to forego 
an attempt to fashion clarity from confusion and instead to recognize either 
that the language in the reports was deliberately fudged or that it was not 
written by a lawyer terribly conversant with tort law. 
Finally, practical and policy considerations provide strong support for 
an interpretation which excludes relevance for considerations of feasibility 
or economic hardship with respect to a particular employer. In the first place, 
neither compliance officers nor their area directors are likely to be in a position 
to assess economic factors in order to determine whether removal of a par-
ticular hazard will cause an employer undue hardship. Secondly, the general 
duty clause is already limited to hazards which are causing or likely to cause 
serious physical consequences. It is inconsistent with the entire tenor of the 
Act and its history to permit hazards of such dimension to continue because 
their removal would cause economic harm to the employer. Thirdly, there is 
a policy favoring uniformity of application of the Act among all employers 
regardless of size.68 Workplaces of large employers probably tend to be rel-
atively less hazardous than workplaces of small employers performing the same 
or similar operations.69 However, to permit recognized serious hazards to 
exist in small businesses because of economic considerations, but to require 
large firms in the same industry to abate the same hazards, would constitute 
an unfair advantage to the small firms, an advantage subsidized by the health 
and safety of their workers. While Congress recognized the problem of achiev-
ing uniform high standards of health and safety in small as well as large work-
places, it responded only by making loans available from the Small Business 
Administration to assist small employers70 and by requiring the Secretary 
of Labor to consider the size of the employer's business in setting penalties 
common law, individuals are obliged to refrain from actions which cause harm to others." Id. 
65 The report of the Senate Committee refers expressly to F.E.L.A. Id. at 851. In addition, 
in describing to Senator Dominick how the Act would operate, Senator Saxbe used as his example 
a famous F.E.L.A. case, Gallick v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 372 U.S. 108 (1963), involving liability 
for a "bug bite." LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 345. 
66 In damages actions under F.E.L.A., "the test of a jury case is simply whether the proofs 
justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, 
in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought." Rogers v. Missouri P.R.R., 
352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957). 
67 See text at p. 617 supra. 
68 See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 144. 
69 See Statement of Jacob Clayman, Administrative Director, Industrial Union Department, 
AFL-CIO, in 1973 Oversight Hearings 183. 
70 15 U.S.C. § 636(b)(5) (1970). 
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for violations of the Act.71 Congress did not provide for exceptions or variances 
based on employer size. 
If the foregoing analysis, rejecting a negligence-type calculus, is correct 
a further problem arises: how to deal with situations, not mentioned in the Act 
and not clearly recognized in the legislative history, in which it would be lu-
dicrous, grossly unfair, or unwarranted by implied policy to penalize or even 
order abatement of certain hazards in particular industries or lines of employ-
ment. Such situations include employments of great public importance or 
which, as a class, have obvious and virtually universal public and congres-
sional approbation but which cannot be carried on without the presence of 
some such hazards. Examples include professional athletics, police work, fire 
prevention, explosives manufacturing, and some kinds of scientific experi-
mentation.72 It is here73 that the qualification "so far as possible," found in 
the Act's statement of purposes and policy, should be applied. In such employ-
ments, hazards should not be deemed violations of the general duty clause 
if such hazards are not preventable except by prohibiting the activity or by 
rendering the activity ineffective to serve its public purpose. On the other hand, 
the existence of hazards which could be mitigated or prevented by the enforce-
ment of safety rules, by the use of protective devices, or by other means which 
permit the activity to be carried on effectively would still constitute general 
duty violations. 
The rationale for this special class of exceptions is neither that the general 
duty clause applies only to hazards preventable by feasible means, as suggested 
by Judge Wright in National Realty,74 nor that public interest and public util-
ity may be fed into a negligence-type calculus to determine whether enforce-
ment is "feasible." Rather, it is simply that Congress cannot be assumed to 
have intended to close such employments without substantial debate and without 
expressly so providing.in the Act. However, it should never be lightly presumed 
that a particular employment falls within this class of "implied" exceptions, 
since the existence of such a class can only be justified as a necessary and limited 
exception to the general view that Congress only intended exemptions and 
variances which it expressly wrote into the Act. 
C. The Feasibility Criterion 
Even if OSHA officers may not, by virtue of the foregoing analysis, take 
economic considerations into account or otherwise predicate their decision 
to issue a citation for a general duty violation on a determination of reason-
ableness, the question remains whether the court in National Realty was cor-
71 Occ. Safety & Health Act § 17(i), 29 U.S.C. § 666(i) (1970). 
72 Employments which contain some inherent dangers from outside factors over which an 
employer has no control-such as traffic hazards to bus drivers-and which are therefore in-
herently dangerous, may also be included in this category. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 480. See also 
FOM VIII A.2.c.(2). 
73 And in the provision allowing exceptions for reasons of national security. Occ. Safety & 
Health Act § 16. 29 U.S.C. § 665 (1970). 
74 National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d at 1266. Cf. Brennan v. OSHRC, - F.2d 
- (3d Cir. 1974) ("so far as possible" language suggests that section 5(a)(I) duty must be achievable). 
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rect in limiting the general duty to those hazards which are recognized by 
safety experts as preventable by feasible means.75 
Judge Wright's approach in National Realty does have several virtues ab-
sent in the "reasonableness" approach. (1) Presumably, compliance officers and 
others charged with the enforcement of the Act will find it easier to discover 
and apply safety experts' views of preventability and feasibility than to make 
an on-the-scene evaluation of reasonableness during each inspection. (2) To 
the extent that safety experts tend to develop industry-wide standards, rather 
than standards for particular businesses, there is little risk of preferential 
treatment for small businesses.76 And (3), the approach appears consistent 
with a general legislative intent to draw heavily on the expertise of occupa-
tional safety and health experts.77 
On the other hand, this approach raises significant practical and policy 
problems.7s In the first place, the statutory language says "recognized" and 
not "recognized and feasibly preventable." While the legislative history re-
flected much confusion about the meaning of the word "recognized," including 
who would do the recognizing,79 the question of preventability only arose 
with respect to assertions that it would be unfair to penalize an employer for 
failing to eliminate a hazard he did not or could not know existed.so Judge 
Wright'S approach also suggests erroneously that safety experts would only 
give "recognition" to feasibly preventable hazards. While possibly true with 
respect to experts employed by management, there is nothing in the court's 
opinion or in the legislative history to suggest that the words "recognized 
hazard" constitute a term of art with such meaning among safety experts, 
and there is some more recent evidence that it does not.Sl Further, because of 
the broad coverage of the Act there may well be many types of employments 
and, indeed, industries in which safety standards have not been developed 
by experts. In such situations, serious hazards may develop which are rec-
ognized by the employer himself or by most of the employers in the industry. 
It was presumably one of the purposes of the general duty clause to reach 
and prevent such hazards.s2 To deny OSHA officials the power after an in-
spection to cite for hazards that are generally known to exist in the industry, 
75Id. 
76 But see id. n.37. 
77 Various sections of the Act require the Secretary of Labor to draw advice from safety ex-
perts. See, e.g., Occ. Safety & Health Act §§ 7(a)(1) & (b), 20, 29 U.S.C. §§ 656(a)(1) & (h), 669 
(1970). 
78 The requirement that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration henceforth 
bear the burden of proving the feasible means by which the hazard could be prevented, National 
Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d at 1266, would require compliance officers to he trained 
not only in how to recognize violations, a difficult enough task, but how to avoid them, a matter 
better left to experts familiar with the business or industry. See, e.g., Secretary of Lahor v. Getter 
Trucking, Inc., 1 Occ. SAFETY & HEALTH REp. 1743 (OSHRC Apr. 30, 1974). 
79 See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 346. See also Morey 995-96, 1001-02. Cf National Realty & 
Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d at 1265. 
80 See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 877, 881. See also id. at 380. 
81 In Industrial Union DeP't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, for example, the recommendations of NIOSH, 
presumably based on expert determinations, for immediate implementation of standards for as-
bestos dust were delayed for two years by the Secretary of Labor in order to take into account 
problems of economic feasibility ignored hy NIOSH experts. 499 F.2d at 479. 
82 See, e.g., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 149,851-52. 
THE LAW OF TORTS 625 
that are obvious, or that are actually known by the employer83 would be de-
moralizing to both compliance officers and to the employees whose safety and 
health the Act was designed to protect. Finally, there is nothing in the Act 
or its history to suggest that a statutory hazard, once recognized, should not 
be prevented by closing down the employments in which it exists in those 
rare cases when no more feasible means are available. To the extent that such 
power exists, all such hazards are preventable.84 Indeed, the National Realty 
court's only relevant citations85-to the "so far as possible" language in the 
purposes clause, to language of the House committee report which asserts 
that (an earlier, though more expansive version of) the general duty clause 
protects workers from "preventable" dangers, and to the definition of "duty" 
in section 4 of the Restatement of TOrts 86-do indeed suggest that the general 
duty only applies to preventable hazards, but in no way support the view that 
preventability is limited by feasibility.87 
D. The Meaning of "Recognized" 
Although feasibility and other elements of the negligence calculus are 
thus not part of the determination, the proper definition of "recognized" and 
'~likely" still requires clarification. However, the legislative history provides no 
clear-cut definition of what constitutes a "recognized" hazard.88 What does 
seem clear is that Congress did not adopt the standard of knowledge and knowl-
edgeability, including the duty to inspect for hazards, which would be required 
by common law of employer-invitors to employee-business visitors.89 That 
standard, like other negligence concepts mentioned earlier, would be dif-
ficult to apply efficiently in the Act's administrative enforcement scheme.90 
On the other hand, requiring employers to know of and eliminate hazards 
83 It is by no means clear that National Realty requires this result. The court merely held that 
a hazard which safety experts deemed feasibly preventable was "recognized." It was not called 
upon to decide whether hazards generically recognized by most of the members of an industry 
or actually recognized by a particular employer, though not acknowledged by safety experts, 
would be deemed recognized. The thrust of the decision suggests they might be so recognized 
if, but only if, their prevention was feasible. 489 F.2d at 1265 n.32, 1265-67. However, the 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that a hazard is recognized if personally known to 
the employer. Brennan v. OSHRC, - F.2d - (8th Cir. 1974). 
84 Morey 993. 
85 489 F.2d at 1266 n.35. 
88 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 4 (1965). 
87 The National Realty court cites section 4 to support its view that "the very word duty implies 
an obligation capable of achievement." 489 F.2d at 1266 n.35. That may be true, but refraining 
from an activity is one means of fulfilling an obligation. Furthermore, comment b to section 4 
makes it clear that the section only defines "duty" in the context of the law of negligence, REsTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 4, comment b (1965), as opposed to duties which may arise under other 
tort rules. 
88 Cf. Morey 995-96, 1001-03. See also FOM VIII A.2.b.(1). 
89 Senator Dominick offered an amendment to the Senate bill which would have substituted 
"readily apparent" for "recognized." LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 380. 
90 Except, of course, in obvious cases. Such determinations are necessary in order to establish 
a serious violation, Occ. Safety & Health Act § 17m, 29 U.S.C. § 666(j) (1970). However, there 
is no compelling reason for compliance officers to prove that a violation is serious rather than 
nonserious. Compare id. § 17(b), 29 U.S.C. § 666(b), with id. § 17(c), 29 U.S.C. § 666(c). 
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(1) generally understood by "conscientious" safety experts91 or by members of 
the industry to exist in a particular industry or type of business,91a (2) obvious 
on visual inspection of the workplace, or (3) actually known by the employer,Olb 
would be fairly easy to administer by compliance officers and would not impose 
an excessive burden on employers to expend large sums searching out risks 
not generally known to exist in the particular employment. It would, however, 
require them to keep abreast of safety developments in their industry. 
This interpretation of the "recognized" requirement has the virtue of 
avoiding distortion of the plain meaning of words which, with increasing 
justification, is likely to irritate laymen, especially those whose safety and health 
are supposed to be protected by the Act. It is not unreasonable to infer that 
a serious hazara the existence of which is obvious to the senses or which has 
specifically been brought to the employer's attention has been "recog-
nized." But most persuasive is the argument that the suggested interpretation 
is consistent with the underlying policy of the Act "to assure so far as possible 
every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working con-
ditions." 
E. The Meaning of "Likely" 
The requirement that the hazard be "causing or likely to cause" serious 
harm should in no event be equated with the preponderance of evidence re-
quirement of the burden of proof in negligence cases, as seemed to be the case 
in the original Compliance Operations Manual. 92 To require that a compliance 
officer establish more likely than not that a serious injury will occur as the 
result of a particular hazard would all but eliminate the effectiveness of the 
general duty clause, particularly in industries where recognized hazards abound 
but few employees of any particular small employer have a better than 50 per 
cent chance of suffering harm from a particular hazard in any given period of 
time. Even if the general duty clause were held to impose a negligence-type 
standard of care on employers, the likelihood of harm under the negligence 
calculus would only have to be unreasonably great in view of the seriousness 
of the harm and the burden of avoiding it; even a slight possibility might suf-
fice in some cases.93 It is evident that the drafters of the Manual misapplied 
the burden required to establish a violation-a preponderance of the ev-
idence94-to the question whether there is sufficient likelihood that the hazard 
will cause harm. 
91 National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d at 1266. 
91a American Smelting & Refining Co. v. OSHRC, - F.2d - (8th Cir. 1974). 
91b Brennan v. OSHRC, - F.2d - (8th Cir. 1974). 
92 See OSHA, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, COMPLIANCE OPERATIONS MANUAL VIII-2 (1972). The 
OSHRC, however, has held that the term .. 'likely' denotes a higher degree of probability than a 
mere possibility." Secretary of Labor v. Arizona Pub. Servo Co., 1 OCC. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. 
1369 (OSHRC Oct. 18, 1973). The relevant provision of the Compliance Operations Manual has been 
omitted from the Field OPerations Manual, FOM VIII A.2.b.(2). 
93 PROSSER 145-49. 
94 See Secretary of Labor v. Armor Elevator Co., 1 OCC. SAFETY & HEALTH REp. 1409 (OSHRC 
Nov. 20, 1973). 
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This still leaves open the question of how likely the advent of serious harm 
has to be in order to meet the statutory standard of likelihood. Richard Morey 
has suggested that the appropriate test is "plausibility, not probability" or 
"whether reasonably foreseeable circumstances could lead to the perceived 
hazards resulting in serious physical harm or death."95 Judge Wright in Na-
tional Realty accepted and embellished the plausibility test: "If evidence is 
presented that a practice could eventuate in serious physical harm upon other 
than a freakish or utterly implausible concurrence of circumstances, the Com-
mission's expert determination of likelihood should be accorded considerable 
deference by the courts."96 Since there is no indication of the required de-
gree of likelihood, the word likely alone does not really provide much illumina-
tion. Therefore, Judge Wright'S solution, to leave the matter, within limits, 
to the expert determination (more likely the informed discretion) of the OSHRC 
is a fair resolution of the issue. 
F. Conclusion 
It follows from the foregoing analysis that the general duty clause pro-
vides a qualified absolute standard for safety rather than a relative standard 
balanced by considerations of economic or other feasibility. In view of the 
dimensions of the safety problem, such a standard does not seem excessively 
harsh, particularly if the existing qualifications are considered. A hazard has 
to be recognized, not merely recognizable by a reasonably prudent man under 
the same or similar circumstances. The hazard has to be causing or threatening 
death or serious harm, thereby excluding risks of only minor harm which 
might be encompassed by a negligence standard. The threat has to be one 
of physical harm, not of emotional harm, which is increasingly becoming 
actionable under negligence law. And the hazard is only actionable if it is 
causing or likely to cause the statutory harm, thus possibly excluding some 
hazards which might have been actionable under negligence law if injury in fact 
ensued. With these significant qualifications it does not seem unreasonable for 
Congress to have decided to eliminate all such statutory hazards from the work-
place. To say that an employer must eliminate such hazards from the workplace 
is not the same as saying that the employer's duty is absolute or that he is an 
insurer, as those terms are used in tort law or in the Act's legislative history. 
That the cost of eliminating the hazards might cause some marginal or unavoid-
ably hazardous employments to shut down may be unfortunate, but no more un-
fortunate than forcing the closing of establishments that cannot afford to comply 
with tort duties or that are rendered bankrupt by tort judgments. To adopt an in-
terpretation of the general duty clause more qualified than that offered here 
would deny to workers the "safety bill of rights" promised when the Act was 
passed, both by weakening their protection against serious injury-creating 
hazards and by imposing difficult decisions and evidentiary burdens on an 
inspection and enforcement staff already inadequate to achieve the Act's ob-
jectives with respect to all covered employments. 
95 Morey 997-98. 
96 489 F.2d at 1265 n.33. 
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III 
THE EFFECT OF THE ACT ON TORT REMEDIES 
While administrative regulation of safety and health may and frequently 
does affect the rights of the class intended to be protected by the legislation 
and the corresponding liability of those subject to regulation, the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act of 1970 contains express language designed to minimize, 
if not to eliminate, such effect: 
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to supersede or in any manner af-
fect any workmen's compensation law or to enlarge or diminish or affect in 
any other manner the common law or statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of 
employers and employees under any law with respect to injuries, diseases, or 
death of employees arising out of, or in the course of, employment.D7 
Although this section on its face seems clearly to prohibit effects on common 
law and statutory rights, as well as on workmen's compensation, the legis-
lative history reflects the same sort of confusion about what is meant by com-
mon law rights that was observed with respect to the nature of the duties im-
posed by the general duty clause. Thus, both Senate and House committee 
reports indicate an intention not to "affect any Federal or state workmen's 
compensation laws, or the rights, duties, or liabilities of employers and em-
ployees under them,"98 but are silent as to intention with respect to other com-
mon law and statutory rights. That the language of the section prohibits af-
fecting such rights only "with respect to injuries, diseases, or death of employees 
arising out of, or in the course of employment," and that the emphasized 
phrase constitutes a term of art under workmen's compensation law, hardly 
excludes the possibility that rights other than those provided under work-
men's compensation acts might be created by such injury, disease, or death. 
Whatever the intention, however, the Act will unavoidably have an effect 
on some common law rights and possibly on rights under workmen's com-
pensation. This consequence flows from the fact that workmen in some 
states still retain the right to sue their employers at common law or by statute 
for damages for work-related injuries.99 In addition, workmen's compensation 
benefits are increased in some states if the injured employee can prove that 
his injury was caused by his employer's violation of a safety statute or regula-
tion. IOO Thus, to the extent that existing state safety statutes and administrative 
regulations are changed or eliminated as a result of the Act, either by replace-
ment by federal standardslol or by different state standards promulgated un-
der a state plan, employees' rights and employers' obligations, either under 
91 Occ. Safety & Health Act § 4(b){4), 29 U.S.C. § 653{b){4) (1970). 
98 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 162, 864 (emphasis added). 
99 See 2 A. LARSON, THE LAw OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 67 (1974). In about two-thirds 
of the states, workmen or employees may elect to retain common law rights and duties. 
100 See id. § 69. See, e.g., OHIO CONST. art. 2, § 35. 
101 State occupational safety and health standards, whether statutory or promulgated by 
administrative regulation, are by clear implication preempted by the Act except in two situations. 
(1) Where no federal standard is in. effect with respect to particular occupational safety or health 
issues, the state may continue to enforce state standards applicable to those issues, Occ. Safety 
& Health Act § 18{a), 29 U.S.C. § 667{a) (1970). (2) Where a state plan is approved, the state may 
enforce its own standard with respect to issues covered by the plan. Language in the administra-
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doctrines such as negligence per sel02 or under the workmen's compensation 
surcharge, must likewise change. 
A sensible reading of the section, therefore, would seem to bar the implica-
tion of new statutory causes of action for damages under the Act, at least in 
suits by employees ~gainst their employers,103 but permit new or different 
safety and health regulations promulgated under the Act, or under state plans, 
to be used in other actions to the same extent non-OSHA safety and health 
regulations are permitted to be used. l04 While this interpretation is not without 
its difficulties, it has the virtue of keeping standards of care in negligence 
cases in conformity with standards required by the Act and of avoiding the 
confusion which might be caused by the existence of two divergent sets of 
regulations in states which permit a workmen's compensation surcharge. Most 
importantly, the broad safety and health objectives of the Act may be supported, 
and chance of their achievement enhanced, by permitting OSHA standards 
to be given effect in private actions. Even without Congress' expression of 
intention not to affect existing rights, the usual reasons advanced for implying 
a cause of action-that adequate state remedies are not available, that uniform 
effects are required nationwide, or that a statutory cause of action is necessary 
to support the legislative policyl05-do not at this time seem to be very cogent 
here. It should be noted for future reference, however, that further deteri-
oration of workmen's compensation benefits relative to workers' salaries and 
the inflated dollar could so cheapen the cost of workmen's compensation that 
employers might find it less expensive to avoid taking costly measures to come 
into compliance with the Act and risk OSHA penaltiesl06 than to prevent worker 
harm. In such event, incentives to employer self-enforcement would be diluted, 
justifying a re-examination of whether a statutory cause of action might be 
necessary to achieve the Act's policies. 
Assuming some effect for OSHA standards in private damage actions, 
several questions remain. (1) Should violations of specific standards constitute 
conclusive evidence of negligence? (2) If not conclusive, what is the relevance 
of such a violation? (3) Should violation of the general duty clause be given 
the same effect as a violation of a specific standard? (4) To what extent should 
compliance with OSHA standards or the general duty clause constitute ev-
tion bill which would have avoided preemption except in cases of actual conflict between state 
and federal standards was not included in the bill. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 27. Cj. Columbus 
Coated Fabrics v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, - F.2d - (6th Cir. 1974). 
102 See generally PROSSER 200-04. 
103 Accord, Byrd v. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc., 496 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1974); Russell v. Bartley, 
494 F.2d 334 (6th Cir. 1974); Skidmore v. Travelers Ins. Co., 356 F. Supp. 670 (E.D. La.), affd 
per curiam, 483 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973); Hare v. Federal Compress & Warehouse Co., 
359 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Miss. 1973). But see Comment, Federal Common lAw Remedies Under 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 47 WASH. L. REv. 629 (1972). Unaccountably, 
this Comment does not take into consideration the prohibition of section 4(b)(4) of the 
Act, Occ. Safety & Health Act § 4(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (1970). 
104 See generally Morris, The Role of Administrative Safety Measures in Negligence Actions, 28 TEXAS 
L. REv. 143 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Morris]. 
105 See Note, Implying Civil Remedies From Federal Regulatory Statmes, 77 HARV. L. REv. 285, 
291-96 (1963). 
106 Penalties have tended to be low except for repeated or willful violations or continuing 
failures to abate a violation. 
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idence of due care? (5) What is the relevance of compliance or noncompliance 
with OSHA standards in employees' third party actions against (a) employers 
of persons other than the employee-plaintiff, (b) non-employers, and (c) fel-
low employees? (6) Will an employee's violation of his duties under the Act 
constitute a complete or partial defense, under contributory negligence or 
comparative negligence, in actions brought by the employee to recover damages 
for his injuries? And, (7) should failures by persons charged with enforcement 
of the Act, such as compliance officers, give rise to private damage actions 
by employees or employers?I07 
A. Actions By an Employee Against His Employer 
1. Using the Act Offensively 
In those situations where an employee retains a common law right of 
action for negligence against his employer, the effect of proof of the em-
ployer's violation of a specific standard or his general duty under the Act 
should turn on whether violation of such duty or standard is necessarily a 
failure to exercise due care or only constitutes evidence thereof. loa The neg-
ligence calculus has already been shown to be irrelevant to whether an em-
ployer has violated the general duty clause. lo9 Similarly, there is nothing in 
the Act or its legislative history which suggests that specific standards are to 
be developed on the basis of what safety and health precautions are "reasonable" 
either for an entire industryllO or for specific employers.lll It follows, then, 
that violation by an employer of his general duty or specific standards ought 
not to constitute conclusive evidence of negligence. 
On the other hand, violations of duties under the Act should properly be 
admitted as evidence of negligence. In the first place, it can be argued that 
employers who fail to comply with mandatory safety regulations without 
justification are acting unreasonably.1l2 Further, the existence of specific 
standards will generally constitute evidence that an employer knew or should 
107 Other questions relating to the effect of the Act in tort actions, such as the use of records 
kept by employers as evidence, the use of testimony by OSHA compliance officers, admissibility 
and other uses of medical records, and the extent to which breach of duties created by the Act 
but not directly related to safety, such as the prohibition against discrimination, Occ. Safety & 
Health Act § ll(c), 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1970), and the Secretary's duty to protect trade secrets, 
id. § 15, 29 U.S.C. § 664, give rise to possible tort actions, will not be discussed here. See generally 
Stramondo, Litigation Impact, 9 TRIAL, Jul.-Aug. 1973, at 29. 
108 See generally Morris. 
109 See text at pp. 616-27 supra. Negligence may be relevant, however, in determining 
whether a violation is "se~ous." See Occ. Safety & Health Act § 170>, 29 U.S.C. §6660> (1970). 
110 But see Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d at 477-78 (Secretary of 
Labor may consider economic feasibility). 
111 In Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, the court stated that "the concept of economic 
feasibility [does not] necessarily guarantee the continued existence of individual employers." 
!d. at 478. See also Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 COLUM. L. REv. 1147, 1161-63 (1942). 
112 In such cases evidence of violation should be treated as negligence per se. See Arthur v. 
Flota Mercante Gran Centro Americana S.A., 487 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1973) (violation of OSHA 
standard held negligence per se). See also Morris 147-48. The same reasoning applies to a failure 
to abate a hazard after a citation and abatement order have been issued, Occ. Safety & Health 
Act § 17(d), 29 U.S.C. § 666(d) (1970), and to a failure to comply with a posting requirement, 
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have known of the hazard the regulation was designed to eliminate, U3 al-
though it should be open for an employer, particularly a small one, to show 
that because the Act's administrators failed to provide adequate notice or 
because of other special circumstances, it was not unreasonable for him or for 
employers in his business or industry to be unaware of the hazard.1l4 An 
individual employer should also be permitted to offer evidence to show 
that it was not unreasonable for him to fail to comply with a particular stan-
dard either because the burden of compliance exceeded the risk and likelihood 
of injury or because, although not in compliance, his place of employment 
was, by virtue of other safety or health measures, as safe as it would have 
been if he had been in compliance. us 
The general duty, teo, may require more than reasonable conduct. us 
In addition, violations of the general duty are particularly inappropriate for 
negligence per se standards because their generality is almost equal to that 
of the negligence standard itself. However, because an employer only violates 
his general duty when the hazard is "recognized," proof of such violation 
should establish that the employer knew or should have known of the hazard 
because it was generally known in the industry, obvious or actually known 
to the employer, or because the Act creates a special duty to keep abreast of the 
opinions of safety experts. The employer has a heavy burden, indeed, if he 
tries to show that because of his special circumstances he reasonably failed 
to know of a widely recognized or obvious hazard. Further, proof of a general 
duty violation tends to show that the risk was of death or "serious physical 
harm," and that the hazard was "likely" to cause such harm, as those terms 
are defined under the Act. 
While violations of the Act may constitute evidence of negligence, ad-
mission of specific determinations issuing or upholding citations or penal-
ties under the Act should be viewed with caution. From a practical perspec-
tive, enforcement of the Act, particularly the work of the OSHRC, could be 
burdened and hampered if employers charged with injury-associated viola-
tions felt compelled to contest and perhaps appeal each citation or penalty 
issued for such violations in order to avoid the powerful effect of having such 
determinations introduced in evidence at trial of a negligence claim.1l7 On 
the other hand, employers not aware of possible evidentiary uses are un-
likely to contest even unwarranted citations as to which there are no penal-
id. § 17(h), 29 U.S.C. § 666(h). In the latter situation, however, plaintiff might still have difficulty 
proving that the failure to post a notice was a proximate cause of his injuries. 
1I3See Morris 150-51. Moreover, violation of section 17(d), failure to abate after citation, 
would constitute evidence of actual knowledge. Occ. Safety & Health Act § 17(d}, 29 U.S.C. § 666(d} 
(1970). 
114 Morris 158. 
115 This situation is similar to nonconformity to industry custom, as opposed to subconformity. 
See generally Morris, supra note Ill. 
116 See National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d at 1265 n.34. Furthermore, the 
court stipulated that "employers have a general duty to do virtually everything possible to prevent 
and repress hazardous conduct by employees." [d. at 1268 (emphasis added). 
117 The Occupational Safety and Health Administration gives priority in determining which 
employers to inspect to employments where injuries have actually occurred. FOM IV-l to -2. 
Most of the contested cases dealt with by the OSHRC involve actual injuries. See generally Decisions, 
I Oee. SAFETY & HEALTH REp. (1974). 
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ties assessed or, as is the usual case, as to which only light penalties are 
assessed. In such cases it would be unfair to give OSHA determinations 
evidentiary weight. 
Where citations are contested and taken to the OSHRC there is some-
what greater justification for admitting the OSHRC finding into evidence. 
Hearing examiners use a "preponderance of the evidence" standard of proof 
in determining whether to affirm, modify, or set aside a citation or 
penalty.1ls An employer aggrieved by the hearing examiner's decision may 
seek discretionary review by the OSHRC itself.119 If granted, the Commis-
sion will apply the same burden of proof. Thus, it can be argued that an em-
ployer who contests a violation and has a hearing before an examiner, and 
possibly the entire Commission, has actually had his day in court and, there-
fore, should not be permitted to contest the admissibility of the Commission's 
decision in a negligence action. However, there are countervailing consid-
erations: the wide coverage of the Act which includes very small businesses 
and marginal employers, gives substance to the need for simple, informal, 
inexpensive, and lawyerless review procedures if such employers are to 
have a fair opportunity to contest citations and penalties. If OSHRC deter-
minations become admissible in negligence actions, only uninformed em-
ployers will dare contest injury-associated citations and penalties without 
a lawyer. Moreover, if, as recommended above, uncontested citations and 
penalties are excluded from evidence in negligence actions, then it would be 
unwise to admit contested determinations, since to do so might discourage 
employers from contesting at all. In short, the "damages-action" tail 
should not be permitted to wag the OSHA dog; OSHA dispute-settlement 
machinery should not be encumbered with effects beyond those provided 
in the Act itself. 
2. Using the Act Defensively 
Violation of OSHA standards and rules is no more conclusive of an em-
ployer's negligence than is compliance conclusive of due care. The fact that 
an employer has complied with all pro~ulgated standards does not speak 
to his negligence with respect to safety and health issues not covered by 
OSHA standards. And, as was clearly recognized in the legislative history, 
standards-particularly consensus standards adopted wholesale without op-
portunity for full hearing-may be obsolete or inadequate or even counter-
productive of safety and health.120 Further, even standards promulgated by 
the Secretary of Labor after the most ample section 6 hearing may, as Paul 
Brodeur's detailed and perceptive study suggests, emerge as less protective 
of employees than a jury might find to be reasonable care for an employer 
under all the circumstances.121 It follows, therefore, that compliance 
118 See Secretary of Labor v. Armor Elevator Co., 1 Occ. SAFETY & HEALTH REp. 1409 (OSHRC 
Nov. 20, 1973). 
1190CC. Safety & Health Act § 12(i), 29 U.S.C. § 661(i) (1970); Secretary of Labor v. Armor 
Elevator Co., 1 Occ. SAFETY & HEALTH REp. 1409 (OSHRC Nov. 20, 1973). 
120 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 848. 
121 Brodeur, Annals of Industry-Casualties of the Workplace, NEW YORKER, Nov. 5, 1973, at 92. 
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evidence should at most be admitted as evidence of due care,122 thus re-
quiring the plaintiff to prove that the standard was inadequate and that 
defendant's reliance upon it did not constitute due care under the circum-
stances. 
Normally, compliance with the general duty will as a practical matter 
absolve an employer from liability for negligence simply because the gen-
eral duty clause usually requires more than merely reasonable pre-
cautions.123 Practically, however, employers will rarely use compliance 
with the general duty clause as a defense since it will be easier for a de-
fendant to show that he exercised reasonable care. Evidence of a practice 
of diligently searching out and eliminating hazards which might other-
wise constitute general duty violations would, of course, constitute evidence 
of reasonable care. There are instances, however, when compliance with 
the general duty clause would not fulfill an employer's obligation to his 
employees as business visitors under the common law.124 In such cases 
compliance with the employer'S general duty is irrelevant to the issue of 
his liability at common law. 
Determinations by the Secretary of Labor or the OSHRC that a violation 
does not exist should not be admissible in evidence by an employer to establish 
his compliance with the Act: while employees may become parties to OSHRC 
proceedings in cases where employers contest citations and penalties,125 
they may not themselves contest the Secretary's failure to issue citations or 
penalties.126 For reasons similar to those which prohibit using collateral 
estoppel against those who were not parties to the first action, adminis-
trative determinations exonerating an employer in non-contested cases 
should not be permitted to be used defensively against an injured em-
ployee in a negligence action. But even in contested cases, where employ-
ees may become parties, OSHRC determinations should not be used defen-
sively; if they were to become admissible, employers' and employees' attorneys 
might use the OSHRC forum to litigate their tort cases. 
B. The Effect of Violation of an Employee's Duties 
While the' Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 imposes a duty 
on each employee to abide by "occupational safety and health standards 
and all rules, regulations, and orders issued pursuant to this chapter which 
are applicable to his own actions and conduct,"127 Congress refrained from 
providing any sanctions or machinery to enforce the duty. Further, the in-
tent is clear not to allow employee violations of their section 5(b) duties 
to constitute a defense or excuse for violations of the employer'S own 
122 Morris 159. 
123 See note 116 supra. 
124 See text at p. 617 supra. 
125 Occ. Safety & Health Act § IO(c), 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1970). 
126 The Act only provides for contest by an employer or employee representative on the ground 
that the time fixed for abatement of a violation by the Secretary is unreasonable. !d. 
127 [d. § 5(b), 29 U.S.C. § 654(b). 
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obligations under the Act.128 Essentially, the determination of what sanc-
tions might be imposed against violating employees was left to the pro-
cess of bargaining between employers and employee representatives. Thus, 
except to the extent that such employee duties are enforceable in damages 
actions brought by or against employees, the clause has no operative effect 
other than, perhaps, to render unenforceable provisions in employer-em-
ployee agreements which call for violation of such duties. 
Whether or not an employee violated his section 5(b) duty might be-
come relevant in at least three situations: (1) where an employee is suing 
his employer or a third person for damages for employment-related in-
juries and the defendant pleads contributory or comparative negligence; 
(2) where an employee is sued for damages by another employee or third 
person for injuries caused by defendant's alleged failure to comply with 
such duty;129 and (3) where an employer is sued by a third person to recover 
for injuries caused by an employee's negligence. 
Whether an employee's violation is relevant to such situations ought not 
to turn on the presence or absence of sanctions against employees in the 
Act itself. Whatever the reasons may have been for omitting such sanc-
tions, it is clear that there was no intent to absolve employees of their respon-
sibilities with respect to occupational safety and health. On the contrary, 
there is recognition in the legislative history that, in order for the Act to 
succeed, cooperation and compliance by employees is essentiaI.130 That 
Congress in order to achieve its preventive objectives decided to lay the 
onus on employers should not, therefore, be taken as determining whether 
employee violations of their own duties should affect compensation policies 
applied in actions at law for damages. 
Thus, in the relatively rare case where an employee retains the right to 
sue his own employer for negligence causing on-the-job injury, the em-
ployer ought generally be permitted to introduce evidence of the em-
ployee's violation of a safety or health rule applicable to his own conduct 
as evidence of the employee's contributory negligence; the rationale and 
analysis here is much the same as that suggested above with respect to em-
ployer violations of safety standards.131 
However, a subsidiary question arises: do the rules, regulations, and 
orders issued pursuant to the Act-as contemplated by section 5(b)-include 
rules promulgated by the employer in fulfillment of the employer's own gen-
eral or specific duties under the Act? For example, if an employer's gen-
eral duty is to supervise his employees to insure that none ride on the run-
ning board of a front end loader, does compliance with a company rule 
prohibiting such riding rise to the level of an employee's section 5(b) 
duty? As to this question the Act and its legislative history are silent. 
The best response on policy grounds is also unclear because while an affirmative 
128 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 150-51, 851. 
129 See, e.g., Skidmore v. Travelers Ins. Co., 356 F. Supp. 670 (E.D. La.), affd per curiam, 483 
F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973). 
130 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 150. 
131 See text at pp. 630-31 supra. 
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answer would further Congress' expressed interest in encouraging employee 
compliance, it would also lower the incentive for employer supervision while 
raising the incentive for an employer to issue clear-cut and detailed company 
safety rules.132 A negative answer would have the opposite effect. 
The answer to the question is important because violation of company 
rules is generally not held to be evidence of negligence.133 While the policy 
usually offered to support this doctrine is to avoid discouraging industry from 
adopting company safety rules more stringent than due care would ordinarily 
require-by holding employers to the higher standard when they violate their 
own rulesl34-and while the result is just the opposite if the company can use 
its own rules defensively against an employee, nevertheless some courts might 
slavishly follow the doctrine even in the latter situation. By elevating such rules 
to statutory employee duties under section 5(b) the likelihood that those courts 
would properly treat violations of such rules as evidence of negligence would 
be enhanced. But, unfortunately, so would the chance that violations would 
erroneously be treated as conclusive of negligence, adding a si~ificant bar-
rier to employee recovery. 
If a statutory claim or defense will not be implied against an employee 
for violations of his own section 5(b) duties/3s then in suits by or against an 
employee, the effect of his violation of such duties will thus be the same whether 
the situation is covered by section 4(4) or not: the violation should only be 
deemed evidence of negligence. 
C. Actions By Employees Against Third Parties 
Section 4(4) prohibits effect upon "rights, duties and liabilities of employers 
and employees under any law with respect to injuries, diseases, or death of 
employees arising out of, or in the course of employment." The fact that Con-
gress thought the section dealt mainly, perhaps exclusively, with workmen's 
compensationl36 suggests strongly that only employees and their own employers 
were covered. The use of the conjunctive in the section's language plus the 
language drawn from workmen's compensation provides support for an inter-
pretation which would exclude employers other than those who employ the 
employee seeking to enforce his rights. This interpretation is also consistent 
with the general duty clause which explicitly limits the general duty to an em-
ployer's own employees.137 
132 Thus providing itself with a convenient defense if an employee's injury should be caused 
in part by the employee's failure to abide by the rule. 
133 See C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 153 (2d ed. 1969). 
134 See generally Winters, The Evidentiary Value of Defendant's Safety Rules in a Negligence Action, 
38 NEB. L. REv. 906 (1959). 
135 See text at note 105 supra. The main reason would be that the state remedy is adequate. 
However, in this situation the argument against upsetting workmen's compensation by providing 
a duplicate remedy against the employer would not apply. 
136 See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 162, 864. 
137 However, OSHRC Commissioner Cleary has argued convincingly that the definition of 
employer and employee under the Act should be expanded to cover an employer who has the 
ability to control the work environment with respect to hazards affecting other employers' 
employees. See Secretary of Labor v. J.E. Roupp & Co., 1 Occ. SAFETY & HEALTH REp. 1680, 
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Yet the duty to comply with the Act's standards is imposed on employers 
and employees without limitation, and arguably that duty applies to all em-
ployers with respect to all employees-their own or another company's-who 
might suffer the injury or disease the Act was intended to prevent. Arguments 
that the general duty clause (which limits an employer's duty to his own em-
ployees) was intended also to limit the scope of the duty prescribed in section 
5(a)(2) find no support in the Act or in its legislative history. Since virtually all 
suppliers of equipment, machinery, chemicals, and contract services to places 
of employment are themselves "employers," the next question is whether such 
employers' duties to obey specific standards protects all employees, wherever 
located or by whomever employed, who may be injured or suffer illness if 
such standards are not complied with or whether the duty only protects em-
ployees who are either working in a workplace over which the employer charged 
with the duty has some control or are under the control of the charged employer. 
The short answer is that the Act seems intended to protect employees working 
in workplaces over which the charged employer has some control or who are 
under the control of the charged employer.13s Thus, for example, one con-
tractor constructing a scaffold has a duty to obey relevant OSHA standards 
which include within the umbrella of their intended protection the employees 
of another contractor who may use the scaffold. And landowners-employers 
who lease premises to other employers must obey OSHA standards with re-
spect to portions of the premises over which they retain control, for the 
protection of their lessee's employees. On the other hand, manufacturers 
of machinery, equipment, and chemicals for sale to other employers for 
use off of the manufacturer's premises should not be deemed statutory 
"employers" under the Act with respect to employees of the vendee-em-
ployer. Support for this position is fairly substantial in both the Act and its 
legislative history: in general, the framers' focus of concern seemed rather 
clearly to be on the workplace,139 the safety of which is normally under the 
control of employers. The definition of a safety or health standard suggests 
also that practices and conditions in the workplace were the exclusive target.140 
1681 (OSHRC Apr. 15, 1974) (dissent). There is nothing in the Act which is inconsistent with 
that interpretation, if. Dec. Safety & Health Act §§ 3(5), (6), 29 U.S.C. §§ 652(5), (6) (1970) 
(definitions of employer and employee), and the more expansive view would strengthen the Act 
in terms of its policy while bringing the scope of the general duty in line with the duty to obey 
specific standards. 
138 The OSHRC has held that there must be a relationship of employer and employee-
meaning at least the right of the employer to control the employees, if not entirely the conventional 
definition-before the "employer" can be held in violation for exposing the "employees" to a 
hazard governed by a specific standard. See Secretary of Labor v. Humphreys & Harding, Inc., 
1 Occ. SAFETY & HEALTH REp. 1700 (OSHRC May 9, 1974). Further, it has held that an employer 
is not liable for exposing another's employees to a hazard even if the employer has contracted to assume 
the obligation. [d. There is no warrant in the Act or its policy for such a narrow reading of the scope 
of the protection to be provided by the duty to obey specific standards. See id. at 1702-03 (dissent 
by Commissioner Cleary). See also note 137 supra. 
139 See generally LEGISLATIVE HISTORY. 
140 "The term 'occupational safety and health standard' means a standard which requires 
conditions, or the adoption or use of one or more practices, means, methods, operations, or 
processes, reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places 
of employment." Dec. Safety & Health Act § 3(8), 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1970). Although not con-
clusive, this definition more clearly addresses itself to steps within the control of an employer 
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Most importantly, the entire enforcement and standard setting mechanism 
established by the Act presupposes that the workplace is the relevant arena 
and that those employers in control of it are the relevant targets of enforce-
ment.141 
Furthermore, and not less persuasive, is the common sense interpretation of 
the word "employer" which in the context of the Act ought not to be stretched to 
include employers who do not at least exercise some control over a workplace 
in which the protected employees are working or over the employees themselves. 
Policy considerations might well justify imposing OSHA duties on manufacturers 
and suppliers of equipment, materials, and other substances used in the work-
place. Such imposition would tend to require the manufacturer and supplier 
to internalize the costs of safety and health, thus increasing general deterrence. 
At the same time, dangerous things might be kept out of the workplace instead of 
being identified and rendered harmless after they come in or cause mischief. 
However, for reasons to be discussed shortly, OSHA will probably achieve the 
same result by means other than stretching the interpretation of the Act this far. 
There is no basis consistent with this reasoning for implying statutory causes 
of action in favor of employees against those who are not their statutory "em-
ployers."142 Further, even if the clause prohibiting the enlargement of employee 
rights is narrowly construed, and thus limited to rights against the employee's 
own employer, the reasons against implying a statutory cause of action to 
support suits against other employers in control of the workplace143 would not 
seem to be overcome by the policies served by creating new causes of action; 
employees will generally be able to bring negligence actions against such third 
parties and benefit by asserting the violation as evidence of negligence.144 
Normally, this should be sufficient to get by a directed verdict. 
But even if a statutory cause of action or negligence per se cannot be implied in 
favor of employees in suits against third parties such as manufacturers and sup-
pliers of machinery, equipment, chemicals, and other substances, the Act is never-
theless likely to be of considerable assistance to employees and others who sue such 
manufacturers or suppliers based on negligence or strict liability for defective 
products. Whether or not such defendants owe a duty to plaintiff to comply 
with OSHA standards, failure to comply with applicable standards without 
sufficient justification-as where a manufacturer sells a machine knowing it 
is to be used in a workplace without providing or offering to provide a safety 
device required by the Act of statutory employers-should be held admissible 
in an action against a manufacturer or supplier for several purposes: (1) to 
establish defendant knew or should have known of the particular precaution 
who has responsibility for working conditions in the workplace, than to a manufacturer or 
supplier of equipment or chemical substances to a place of employment. 
141 [d. §§ 8-10, 29 U.S.C. §§ 657-59. 
142 Accord, Russell v. Bartley, 494 F.2d 334 (6th Cir. 1974). 
143 See text at note 105 supra. 
144 The defendant employer, in such case, would be deemed an "employer" for purposes of the 
duty clause, Occ. Safety & Health Act § 5, 29 U.S.C. § 654 (1970), but not for purposes of 
the section prohibiting enlargement of common law rights, id. § 4(4), 29 U.S.C. § 653(4). 
This is not inconsistent since, as suggested earlier, Congress may only have intended in section 
4(4) to avoid upsetting rights between employers and employees in situations normally covered 
by workmen's compensation. See text at p. 635 supra. 
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demanded by the Act; (2) to establish that defendant should have been a,vare 
of the hazard avoided by the standard; (3) as evidence that a product lacking 
the precaution is dangerous or defective; and, possibly (4) as evidence that 
the precaution is feasible. While such evidence might be rebutted in a negligence 
action by defendant's evidence that he nevertheless acted reasonably under 
the circumstances applicable to him, or by showing in a products liability case 
that the product, though dangerous, was not unreasonably so, or was not de-
fective,145 admission of the Act's standard should buttress the plaintiffs case. 
D. Actions Against OSHA Personnel for Failure to 
Comply With Their Duties Under the Act 
One of the versions of the Act, proposed in the House, provided that: 
If the Secretary arbitrarily or capriciously issues or fails to issue an order under 
subsection (a) and any person is injured thereby either physically or financially 
by reason of such order or failure to issue such order, such person may bring 
an action against the United States in the Court of Claims in which he may re-
cover the damages he has sustained, including reasonable court costs and at-
torneys' fees.146 
In the final bill, this provision was left out in favor of a provision which provided 
employees with a mandamus action against the Secretary of Labor if he failed 
to seek an injunction against an imminent danger.I47 
The proposal and its final deletion, which followed a heated controversy 
over other sections of the imminent danger provision,I48 should for that 
reason not be taken to speak to the question whether compliance officers or 
other personnel charged with the enforcement of the Act should be held 
liable for negligent failures to perform their statutory duties if such negligence 
leads to employee or employer injury. 
The Act is othenvise silent on the question. In general, however, principles 
developed in other analogous contexts, as where FAA inspectors negligently 
certify aircraft as ainvorthy,149 would seem to apply here. Nevertheless, a 
few factors especially relevant to the Act deserve mention. 
First, it is not clear that the "primary" duty of an employer to comply with 
the Act is analogous to, for example, the primary duty of a pilot, which has 
been held to insulate an FAA inspector from liability in suits arising out of 
aircraft accidents.I5o The legislative history indicates that the employer'S 
duty under the Act was intended to be primary when compared with the em-
ployee'S duty, not necessarily with that of third persons. It would seem pref-
erable, therefore, to apply ordinary proximate cause concepts to situations 
145 See M. FRANKLIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORT LAw AND ALTERNATIVES 298-300 (1971). 
146 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 838. 
1470CC. Safety & Health Act § 13(d), 29 U.S.C. § 662(d) (1970). See also LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
1193 (Conference Report). 
148 See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 885-87. 
149 Liability might accrue under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1970). See 
Peters, Legal Responsibility of Govemmentfor Commercial Air Safety, 34 J. AIR L. & COM. 479 (1968). 
Cf Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 31 Ill. 2d 69, 199 N.E.2d 769 (1964); Annot., 6 A.L.R.2d 
284 (1949). 
150 United States v. Miller, 303 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1962) (pilot operating under VFR conditions). 
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in which an inspector negligendy fails to note a violation of OSHA standards 
or of the employer's general duty which subsequendy results in an employee 
injury.151 If the trier of fact finds that the employer's subsequent failure to 
discover and remove the hazard was a "superseding cause," then the inspector 
should not be held liable.152 
Second, holding the government liable for the negligence of its employees 
in enforcing the Act is likely to enhance the effectiveness of the enforcement 
mechanism and thus serve Congress' objectives. Since the enforcement arm 
is under the Secretary of Labor-and in view of widespread industry pressure 
to provide more technical assistance to employers (and less enforcement)153-
the negligence remedy might strengthen employees' ability to ensure effective 
enforcement under an administration less than enamored with the Act and 
its methods. Such employee self-help is entirely consistent with the congressional 
intent to provide employees effective participation in the Act's enforcement.154 
CONCLUSION 
In order to assure safe and healthful working conditions for American 
workers, the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 established a com-
prehensive regulatory scheme using prevention, interdiction, and deterrence 
strategies to keep employment and the workplace free of safety and health 
hazards. The Act, however, was not designed to achieve restoration of losses 
for workers injured or made ill as a result of hazards in their employment; 
the restoration systems-workmen's compensation and common law actions 
for damages-were not to be affected. In construing the Act, therefore, the 
primary source should be the Act itself and its legislative history, not doctrines 
or policies drawn from tort law or the law of workmen's compensation. The 
latter can only become relevant if they are shown to further the policies of 
the Act better than other possible approaches. 
An examination of the history of the Act reveals, however, that Congress 
intended to provide workers, insofar as possible, virtually absolute protection 
against serious work-related physical injuries and illnesses. To the extent that a 
balance was required between the safety and health of employees and the eco-
nomic viability of employers, Congress came down heavily on the side of safety and 
health. In that context, rules of law which qualify employer duties by allowing 
serious dangers to exist if "reasonable under the circumstances," designed to 
do justice between individual litigants when one of them is suing for damages, 
cannot be permitted to qualify the stricter duties Congress imposed in order 
to serve its remedial purposes. Nor can the difficulties of administration as-
sociated with the application of those rules be permitted to interfere with the 
simple and effective administration of the Act. 
151 Cf. Gibbs v. United States, 251 F. Supp. 391 (E.D. Tenn. 1965). The court stated that the 
government's liability for the negligence of its inspectors "is subject to the same requirements 
of negligence and causation as would affect the liability of a private person in the same circum-
stances." Id. at 400. 
1~2 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 440-52 (1965). 
153 See generally 1973 Oversight Hearings. 
154 See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 150. 
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Conversely, rules adopted by Congress without regard to restoration pol-
icies ought not to distort the rules and undermine the operation of systems 
designed to restore losses and achieve justice between litigants. Therefore, 
until Congress decides that new reparation schemes are necessary in order 
to achieve better restoration, general deterrence, or both, new statutory 
causes of action should not be implied from the safety and health duties im-
posed by the Act. On the other hand, permitting new safety and health stan-
dards developed under the Act to be used as appropriate standards of conduct 
in common law damage actions will generally serve the Act's objectives and 
be consistent with policies traditionally applied in such cases. 
